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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Understandings of culture have long had a cognitive bias in sociological theory. 
To amend this, I propose a general theory of cognitive-affective linkages that aids 
cultural sociology in particular, but is of relevance to many different areas of 
sociology. I identify several theoretical precedents, Hochschild’s theory of feeling 
rules and gender ideology as well as a few ideas from Freudian psychoanalysis, to 
reconstruct an intellectual path leading to a conception of discursive affects. The 
general theory of these culturally channeled affects transcends many traditional 
dichotomies in sociological theory, e.g. between language and the body, the 
individual and the social, and even between culture and the economic. Three 
empirical sites of discursive affects are then analyzed on a meta-theoretical level: 
1) Values are shared evaluative cognitions or representations of good and evil 
with strong affective attachments. 2) Mood is a shared affective experience, not 
consciously identified as such, yet influencing cognitive-social perceptions. 3) 
Symbolic boundaries are collective fantasies of identity maintained by the 
cognitive and affective work of a group. Throughout the essay, features extracted 
from each of these exemplars are synthesized to produce a social ontology in 
which cognition and affect are inseparable social-historical powers constituting 
individual experience and the individual as we know it. 
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I. Cognition and Affect 
Cognitive-affective linkages pervade social life in emotions, in shared values of good and evil 
(Alexander 2003), in the identity performances of social movements and nationalism (Jaspers 
1997; Brubaker 2009), in the social construction of gender and sexual desire (Butler 1997), and 
in group formation through boundary drawing (Schwalbe et al 2000; Lamont and Molnar 2002). 
Across diverse sociological topics and schools of theory, increasing evidence demonstrates that 
affective experiences accompany collective cognitive processes. I seek to propose a new 
understanding of how shared cognitions have varying levels of psychic charge or affective 
intensity. 
 In this essay I look at three concepts in contemporary sociological theory: values, mood, 
and symbolic boundaries. Each one has its own expanding cluster of apologists, and each seems 
to be gathering more interest and attention every year. I will analyze them here under a new 
light, as fellow specimens all displaying a special relationship between cognition and affect. 
They are cognitive-affective linkages and fibers of the social world. And they are being 
reexamined in 21st century sociology because of a new attitude for embracing difficult trans-
disciplinary phenomena in the social sciences. Grappling with the intersection between affects—
so very bodily—and cognitions—so very abstract—nudges sociological theory a little closer to 
our fantastic multidimensional reality. 
 Defining the basic terms, the first step, is no easy task. Thankfully I can root my 
conceptualizations of cognition and affect within two established intellectual traditions, cultural 
theory and psychoanalytic social theory. Cultural theory, born from symbolic anthropology, has 
long recognized the ideational dimension of social life. The mental beings in this dimension, 
socially shared cognitions, have taken on many different names over the century: typifications, 
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frames, symbol systems, rules, scripts, structures of meaning, etc., and while these terms may be 
used by theorists in different ways, they all recognize the collective nature of cognition. 
Collective cognitions make communication and interaction possible, they transfigure the material 
world into a realm of meaning, and they create shared experiences of the world. This cognitive 
order, culture, adds a dimensional difference to the world: actions, words, places, customs, 
bodies, apparel and other signs all partake in conceptual webs of meaning, enabling and 
configuring the interaction of all these worldly things. 
 What is this cognitive order of culture? Are not cognitions a private, internal type of 
entity that exists within human brains possessed by individuals? How can cognitions be socially 
shared and somewhat externalized in social things?  
Certainly the process of cognition occurs in individuals. But there are at least three 
different, however interconnected registers of culture, a useful distinction made by Paul 
DiMaggio (1997). The idiosyncratic thought processes of an individual brain are, frankly, the 
least effective mode of culture. As soon as an individual tries to communicate such private ideas, 
he or she is forced to hook them up with the already existing web of shared cognitions. The 
famous philosopher of language, Ludwig Wittgenstein, dismissed the very notion of a private 
language.  
Second, there’s a supra-individual order of shared meanings or what DiMaggio calls 
“schemata.” This is what cultural theorists focus upon, the structures of meaning that place 
physical and communicative actions within a wider shared, imaginary cosmos. This register, 
which I will discuss, refers to the ‘sense’ that things have and how things seem to naturally make 
sense.  
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The last register consists of the materiality of culture, the external letter or any other body 
among the nearly infinite kinds of vehicles of meaning that exist. Due to the arbitrary 
relationship between material signifiers and the conceptual signified, this register typically isn’t 
regarded as that important either by cultural theorists. The bodies of culture matter much more 
though when we take the affective dimension of culture into account. Elsewhere, literary 
theorists have taken an interest in the effect of the form of language, in addition to its content, 
upon the aesthetic-affective experience of the reader. However, I do agree that the type of culture 
that matters most, that serves as a blueprint at least for social interactions, is the second register: 
socially shared cognitions. These cognitions certainly have body, the material signifier, but they 
are not in themselves substantially physical.1 Nor are they the spontaneous mental outbursts of 
more basic physical bodies.  
Instead, cognitions arrange and give order to matter according to an intelligibility of their 
own, that is, according to their meaning. I use the word discourse to refer to the ordering agency 
of a complex of social cognitions, following Michel Foucault’s use of the term (Foucault 2002). 
Like language, beliefs and values also have their own rules and grammar of usage, not entirely 
consensual or consistent in every case,2 but with enough logic and power to make the world a 
classification table, differentiating objects and demarcating subjects. Values, mood and 
boundaries are all children of discourse: values are affectively hot, discursive cognitions central 
to the coherence or legitimacy of a discourse; mood is the affective dimension of discursive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Cognitions are not in themselves physical but nevertheless have physical effects, as most cultural theorists assert, 
including their physical effect upon the affective experience of the human body (see below). 
2 Discourse consists of social cognitions, which it can never pull together in a perfectly integrated whole. Social 
cognitions have diverse action-functions and these functions often contradict themselves within the very same 
discursive community. In other words, a discourse may suffer logical contradiction between its cognitions without 
the need for emendation. Subjects of the same discourse may find different meanings within it. 
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formations conjoined together in a historical situation; boundaries are the axes of classification 
through which discourse orders people and things.  
Discourse can sound overly logical and a bit ominous though, no doubt because of its 
association with Foucault’s anti-humanism, dismissing all “anthropological constants” of human 
nature. It is therefore necessary to break discourse down into its smaller parts, its cognitive 
components. Many philosophers and psychologists of the mind have previously analyzed 
cognitions as a schematic entity: cognitions have perceptual functions. The word ‘schema’ is not 
merely another verbose addition to the running tally of synonyms for culture. It stems from 
Immanuel Kant’s philosophy of the mind, and Aristotle’s categories before him, and its meaning 
is crucial for understanding the nature of human cognition.  
Kant broke with his contemporary philosophers over the nature of truth and knowledge, 
the relationship between cognitions and things. When he wrote, “Up to now it has been assumed 
that all our cognition must conform to the objects…Hence let us once try whether we do not get 
farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our 
cognition” (1998 Bxvi), naïve realism took its deathblow. But Kant was not a theorist of culture. 
He thought that the human apprehension of matter and objects was decided by the universal 
structure of the mind. The mind constitutes objects and their relationships through categories, 
which are the conceptual condition of the possibility of knowledge and perception. Categories, 
thoroughly rational and universal for Kant, function schematically to create the human 
experience of the object world. Schemata are the cognitive functions of categories, programming 
the human perception of matter into intelligible bodies, reproducing the world according to 
established codes of interpretation. 
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Kant was wrong on one thing though. Schemata reside in the supra-individual subjective 
order of culture, not in the individual noggin. It is the social cognition of discourse that 
accomplishes the imagining, designing, and construction of the world through categories, not the 
universal structure of the individual mind. Nor are social cognitions limited to metaphysics and 
the function of representation. As speech-act theory has driven into the 20th century noggin, there 
are multiple types of shared cognitions with various functions beyond factual description, many 
of them offering blueprints for intersubjective interactions. If they follow the conventional script, 
utterances have performative effects, from persuading other people of one’s rightness to telling 
other people what to do. Social cognitions thus include complex rules for making successful 
performances in the activity of apologizing or negotiating as well as describing.  
Some schemata have a dynamic, adaptive relationship with the world and are the 
condition of the possibility of experiential learning. Others are further removed from such 
physical hook-ups and assert the existence of spiritual ancestors, witches, heaven and hell, or 
deep interior spaces of the self. All schemata though are information-processing mechanisms, 
interpreting new experiences in the light of old cognitions (DiMaggio 1997). Kant understood 
this point well before the birth of cognitive psychology and its “information processing 
mechanisms.” He rightly speculated the exercise of cognitive schemata in the human 
imagination’s ability to synthesize and reproduce the lived world according to already 
established categories.  
 Enough about Kant and cognition. The important points here are that cognitions are 
social, somewhat external, and manifest most clearly in action, interaction, and communication, 
all of which are made possible by them. Cognitions are shared schemata, having a wide variety 
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of world-constitutive functions. And when pushed together by history and community to make a 
meaningful world, they are called discourse.  
 Switching gears now to the other basic category at stake, affect and theories of affect are 
currently having a renaissance in the social sciences. Increased attention to affect is occurring at 
the cutting edge of many schools of sociological theory and research in a way that is very 
exciting but also fraught with eclecticism and little consensus. While I agree that there is an 
‘affective turn’ occurring across the social sciences, along with a new trans-disciplinary spirit, it 
is still only arriving at the first bend in the turn and enjoys nowhere as near as much prestige and 
legitimacy as cultural theory or the prior ‘cultural turn’ of social theory, perhaps due to its 
newness and relative under-development. The sociology of emotions is but one part of this 
developing story in the academic ascendancy of affect. Sociologists of emotion typically 
promote a strong constructionist perspective on affects, which has been influential but not 
completely persuasive to some other social theorists of affect, such as poststructuralists and 
psychoanalysts. I discuss Arlie Hochschild’s sociology of emotions in much more depth in my 
next section, but here I want to clarify the difference between affect and emotion. 
 Affect includes emotions but also many other things. Many affects have an essential 
cognitive component, as sociologists of emotions have asserted for decades now. Emotions like 
pride or jealousy would not exist and could not be experienced without the contextual activation 
of social cognitions, such as feeling rules and emotion labels. But it is doubtful that the nature of 
affect itself is purely cognitive. James Jasper (1998), a sociologist of the emotions in social 
movements and collective action, distinguishes between specific, interactive emotional 
experiences and a wider range of affects, like mood, trust and attachments. He writes, “Most 
constructionists focus on emotions that represent temporary responses to events and 
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information…But emotions also cover more permanent feelings of the type normally labeled 
affect or sentiment: love for one’s family and other selected individuals; a sense of identification 
with a group and loyalty to its members; fondness for places and objects, perhaps based on 
memories; positive responses to symbols of various kinds; and negative versions of each of 
these” (1998:401-42). Chronic collective moods, for instance, are included in this wider 
company of affects.  
As I will show, mood is an important type of affect because it reveals the detachability 
and dimensional difference between affect and cognition. Mood feelings do not have a direct 
object and are felt even without the prior activation of cognitive feeling rules or emotion 
labeling. This lack of cognition is essential to the experience of moods, for once they are actually 
identified, and causes found, they usually dissipate. However, the unconscious experience of a 
collective mood, as well as of an individual mood for that matter, has powerful cognitive-
perceptual effects. 
 Cognition, while essential to some affective experiences, is not the primary constituent or 
medium of affect, pace the presuppositions of a strong constructionist account. What then is 
affect? How can some affective experiences be both unconscious and collective? Questions like 
these have led me to consider a more psychoanalytic approach to affect for its attention to bodily 
and psychic processes. Affects are experienced, they are felt by bodies. All affects, whether 
specific situational emotions or chronic moods, have this corporeal element, belonging to a 
dimension altogether different from cognition. Cognition and affect are two inseparable modes 
of social life, but only once their difference is appreciated does it make sense to talk about the 
concrete intersections between them.  
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 There is no simple psychoanalytic theory of affect. Psychoanalysis implicitly theorizes 
affect all the time through concepts like fantasy, cathexis, instincts, repression, anxiety, 
idealization, narcissism, humor, transference, etc. All of these concepts refer to affective 
experiences in some way. Freud thought that the interpretation of affects, by situating them next 
to their unconscious causes, was central to the therapeutic process. Clearly this is not the paper to 
systematize psychoanalytic theories of affect; such a project has already been accomplished 
(Spezzano 1993; Green 1999). Instead of expounding basic concepts of psychoanalysis then, I 
will discuss what Freud thought about affect in general. 
 Freud changed his mind concerning affect a few times throughout his life. My reading of 
him is very selective. I think that The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud 1965), though not 
concentrating on affect, is the most useful resource for cultural theorists wanting to incorporate 
affective bodies and psyches into their social analysis. In that book, mental representations and 
chains of thought are entangled with dynamic psychic-affective processes. Here Freud deploys 
both a theory of cathexis, the attachment of desire to a psychic object, and a philosophy of mind 
to explain dream processes and neurosis. This is the Freud of 1899, writing in between his early 
economic models of the psyche—on the mental circulation or damming up of instinctual 
energy—and his 1915 metapsychological papers, thus, long before Freud’s naturalization of the 
Western subject in ego psychology.  
Freud understands affect as a type of psychic energy that has both quantitative and 
qualitative sides to it. Quantitatively, affect originates from the body in overloads of excitation or 
instinctual energy. His stress is on the varying amount of affect, especially as it fluctuates due to 
repression (repression increases affective intensity by preventing it from “discharge”). The 
affective dimension must be measured in terms of quantitative magnitude in addition to 
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qualitative content. Freud uses an array of psychological terms to get at affect’s sensation within 
the body—‘pressure,’ ‘cathectic energy,’ ‘instinctual force,’ and even the economistic sounding 
‘quota of affect.’3  
In their well-received psychoanalytic dictionary, Laplanche and Pontalis note that, for 
Freud, “affect is the qualitative expression of the quantity of instinctual energy and of its 
fluctations” (1973:13).4 Sociologists of emotion will most likely find Freud’s physicalist and 
scientistic terms troubling, as do I, but one can appreciate his economic model of psyche 
metaphorically,5 the main import being the dependence of affect upon physiological arousal. 
Affect involves the movements of the body felt by the body expressed in one’s bodily exterior. 
Of course, arousal is a libidinal term for Freud the sexologist: levels of affective intensity depend 
upon socially demanded sexual repression in the theory of dreams. I however prefer a broader 
non-sexual understanding of affective arousal, qua bodily sensations that I see as fundamental to 
all emotional experiences, anxious or otherwise. 
 Affect is deeply corporeal and yet it can also become attached to ideas or mental 
representations. The main utility of The Interpretation of Dreams for cultural theorists is this 
idea of the separability and attachability of cognitions and affects. Psychic-affective intensity 
becomes mobile when mental “primary processes” like condensation and displacement move an 
affective charge along ideational chains of association. Repressing a highly charged idea, the 
unconscious can displace the affect originally associated with that idea and can re-connect it to 
an otherwise trivial detail of one’s day, hence the vividness of certain details while dreaming. I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This passage is exemplary: “I mean the conception that among the psychic functions there is something which 
should be differentiated (an amount of affect, a sum of excitation), something having all the attributes of a 
quantity—although we possess no means of measuring it—a something which is capable of increase, decrease, 
displacement, and discharge, and which extends itself over the memory traces of an idea like an electric charge over 
the surface of the body” (Freud 1946 [1894]: 75). 
4 Today the relevant naturalistic terms are neurotransmitters like dopamine and serotonin 
5 As Freud himself did, as Jose Brunner argues (Brunner 2002). 
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would wager that this is actually the fundamental type of cathexis in The Interpretation of 
Dreams, the affective cathexis of ideas. Affects are modifiable and displaceable, yet wherever 
they go, whatever new thought they become associated with, the resultant cognitive-affective 
linkage produces some form of bodily arousal.  
The detachability and re-attachability of affects to cognitions is crucial, for instance, to 
any theory of mood. Moods are unconscious affects induced by events and cultures, but the 
actual experience of a mood lingers on even after the mood-inducing events have passed. What I 
propose to do in this essay is to re-theorize discourse and elements of discourse through a social 
psychoanalytic theory of cathexis. Specifically, my aim is to explain the affective cathexis of 
social cognition as this occurs in values, collective moods, and symbolic boundaries. All three 
discursive phenomena reveal the inter-linking of cognition and affect. The process of inter-
linking, however, does not occur within the individual unconscious brain, contra Freudian dream 
theory. It is a social process and occurs within the culture of bodies, in which affective 
attachments are culturally outlined and prefigured.6  
As the reader should realize, my psychoanalytic theorizing does not remain loyal to 
Freud, and from this point on he becomes a footnote. Ultimately the classical psychoanalytic 
theory positing affect to be the product of intra-psychic conflict is unsatisfactory for restricting 
affective intensity to repressive contexts. But within the wider psychoanalytic tradition, there are 
further theoretical tools for moving beyond the classical scene of instinctual repression. Mood, 
values and boundaries are all different kinds of fantasies, as theorized by later relational 
psychoanalysts Melanie Klein and Nancy Chodorow. Fantasies consist of “affect-laden images” 
which unconsciously structure intersubjective interactions (Chodorow 1999:15). Fantasies are a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Or to be more precise, shared affective attachments to cognitions are deployed according to the schematizing 
functions of discourse. This does not make affect any less bodily, nor does it give up the possibility of unconscious 
affective work, including collective mood par excellence. 
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cognitive-affective experience, in which ideas and perceptions enter a nexus of affective 
attachments. According to psychoanalytic social theory, humans wake up each and every day to 
the fantasy world of their subjectivity constructed by cognitive-affective linkages.  
  
II. Origins of a General Theory 
Cognitive-affective linkages refer to a messy hybrid of cultural, psychological and bodily 
dimensions.7  While they can be found in the common situational presence of emotions, well 
theorized by the interactionist tradition in sociology, I want to explore the wider corporeal, 
relational flows of discursive affects. Sociologists presuppose such cognitive-affective linkages 
when they theorize collective sentiments (Durkheim 1995), feelings of national pride and ethnic 
attachments (Anderson 1991), or the shared generational mood felt in a particular time and place 
(Williams 1977). In this section I hope to outline a general theory of cognitive-affective hybrids 
and to see what disparate species of social things it re-classifies under the same genus.  
 Both sociologists of emotions and cultural sociologists already recognize the existence 
and significance of intersections between cognition and affect. Sociologists, as noted, consider 
shared cognitions to be an essential condition of emotional experiences. Affect-related 
cognitions, as in the labeling of emotions, are socially constructed and situationally activated. 
The emotions felt by an individual depend upon cultural representations, i.e. of the 
appropriateness of certain feelings relative to the definition of the situation.  
Arlie Hochschild’s seminal studies of emotion work and labor observe the gap between 
what one feels, what one thinks one should feel, and the feeling this disjuncture produces 
(Hochschild 1979; 1983; 1990; 2003). Emotion work involves efforts to bridge the gap between 
one’s feelings and the emotional norms of the situation that one finds oneself within. Emotion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 C.f. Rom Harre’s (2009) theory of emotions as cognitive-affective-somatic hybrids.  
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self-management always takes place in relation to a particular set of normative “feeling rules,” 
constituting a community’s emotion culture. The standard sociological definition of emotion, 
following Hochschild, recognizes the complex interconnection between sensations (affective 
arousal), representations (cognitive understandings), and rules or norms for gestural display 
(situational expectations) that enable the feeling of even basic emotions.  
Emotions are thus one species of cognitive-affective hybrid, involving perceptual, 
evaluative and physiological elements. This insight into the intersection of cognition and affect 
can be found in many branches of the sociology of emotion in addition to Hochschild’s theory of 
emotion work. Affect control theory explicitly makes “semantic differentials”—the coding of 
objects and situations according to goodness, potency, and activity—a core feature of emotional 
reactions (Heise 1979). In his theory of interaction ritual chains, Randall Collins (2004) 
emphasizes the storing of emotional energy in cognitive form, expectations between rituals on 
the chain.  
 Awareness of cognitive-affective linkages then is nothing new to some extent. However, 
there are certain biases in the sociology of emotions preventing a more comprehensive general 
theory of them. As so defined, emotions are only one species of discursive affects and one with 
certain peculiarities that cannot be generalized onto the wide variety of affective experiences in 
social life. Emotions are, mostly, experienced by individuals for the above theorists. This 
indicates a problem though. Collective emotions are not as amenable to a micro situational 
analysis as is an individual’s anger, sadness, jealousy or disgust.8  
The sociology of emotions universalizes a particular individualism that forecloses a wider 
analysis of cultural affects. As Hochschild was well aware (1979), Goffman’s emotion manager, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The classical theory of collective emotions is reconsidered in Mustafa Emirbayer’s (1996) paper defending 
Durkheim to historical sociologists. 
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capable of ironic distance from the self, is conditioned by Western, modern cultural 
representations of the individual. Hochschild seemingly wants to press against the limits of this 
paradigm. In the years between The Managed Heart (1983) and The Second Shift (2003 [1989]), 
she shifts research questions from how we do emotion work according to “feeling rules” to how 
such emotional cultures relate to culture at large, such as gender ideologies with valuations of 
traditional or egalitarian domestic roles. This is a self-described revision: Hochschild writes 
about her realization that there can be second-order feelings about ‘feeling rules’ themselves.9 
Culture in general is saturated with intense feelings about norms and values, including evaluative 
judgments about emotional norms. These are normative feelings toward certain feeling 
expectations, e.g. acceptance or protest toward the idea that the housewife should repress 
feelings of anger (as studied in The Second Shift).  
 There are actually several different social things at stake here, all being species of 
cognitive-affective linkages: emotions, values and identities. Hochschild’s corpus provides an 
analytic segue from the study of the former to the latter two. For instance, she describes how 
ideology and values are affective objects in themselves, functioning as the “emotional anchor” of 
gender representations. She also discusses the psychodynamic work—we could call it—of 
revising personal emotional strategies in order to live up to a gendered person-archetype, e.g. the 
“super-mom” who can do the second shift by suppressing feelings of resentment. Two new 
species of cognitive-affective linkages emerge in this discussion: the affective attachment to 
cultural values and the psychodynamics of identification with fantasy characters. Both are kinds 
of discursive affects not reducible to the category of ‘emotion’ as previously defined. Rather, let 
us follow a line of thought leading from a cognition-in-emotion perspective, a la the sociology of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 “I had to revise my earlier model, according to which feeling rules were something that governed feelings, and 
were not themselves the object of feelings….in the case of passionate or ambivalent ideologies, I had to stop to 
explore what lay behind feeling rules” (Hochschild 1990:127). 
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emotions, to an affect-in-culture perspective. The main weakness of the cognition-in-emotion 
perspective is that it tends to foreclose consideration of a wider affective economy within 
culture, the latter being evident in aforementioned hybrids like cultural and national values, 
mood and other collective emotions, fantasies of identity relying upon symbolic boundaries, etc. 
An affect-in-culture perspective frames these hybrids through a general theory of cognitive-
affective linkages and their role in historical discursive formations. 
An ontology of diverse cognitive-affective linkages emerges from sociological research 
into the historical contingency of Western, individualist conceptions of personhood. If the 
individuation of the subject is historically specific, 10 then one is lead to think of the discursive 
formations promoting individualism as themselves being psychically charged, supra-individual 
cognitions. Early Foucault (2006), for instance, interrogated the discursive formations of 
‘madness.’ He saw that modern psychiatric experiences of mental illness originated in the 
Classical Age’s othering and Reason’s taming of its categorical opposite through the “great 
confinement.” From Foucault I also derive the notion of discursive affect, a term I use to stress 
the non-dualistic embeddedness of affect in culture and material technology.  
Judith Butler (1997) has more recently reintroduced Foucauldian historicism and 
Freudian psychoanalysis to each other—not the pure antagonists that they are often thought to 
be—producing a theory of the “affective attachments” necessary for any identity performance. In 
Foucauldian-Butlerian poststructuralism, there is no pre-given individual preceding discursive 
power and the affective attachments animating the body. The sociology of emotions, in contrast, 
mostly brackets out the historical-discursive formation of the subject, including the social 
construction of the emotion manager.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Castoriadis 1987, Taylor 1989, and Foucault 1995 on the social construction of the individual. 
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Foucault and Butler are two excellent muses for thinking through bodily affects beyond 
the individual. If affects do not exist except in bodies, cognitive-affective linkages demands a 
theoretical framework for thinking through bodies in the multiple, the bodily, as opposed to the 
(Western, individualistic) body. This is precisely what Foucault and Butler excel at doing. They 
give social science an understanding of discourse, power, and affect as constitutive of bodily 
performances, and a theory of how discursive cognitions and affects give bodies the appearance 
of individual subjectivity.  
What is a ‘discursive affect’ as I am using the term? It is a class of cognitive-affective 
linkages shaped by discursive formations yet felt by bodies. They are socially shared—often 
diffusely so—and simultaneously corporeal, psychosomatic experiences. They are semiotic, 
being based on particular significations that make up symbol systems or representations in the 
cultural system.11 Yet they also refer to a dimension of the cultural imagination largely neglected 
by cultural sociologists as well, except those experimenting with a psychodynamic perspective 
(for instance, Alexander 2006; also Castoriadis 1987). The concept attempts to fuse cultural 
semantics with a psychosomatic dimension of the bodily.  
The theory of discursive affects bridges the textual order of culture with the experienced 
pleasures and pains of people (Barthes 1975). Another term for it could be ‘cultural experience’ 
with an emphasis on our embodied relationship to symbols as cathected or reviled objects. 
Discursive affects are the site at which cultural and psychological dimensions of social life 
converge in the form of shared social imaginaries, in the production of fantasies of the desirable 
or the feared. Symbol systems can be read cognitively, but they can also be measured in terms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Structuralism asserted that symbols never stand alone, but their relation to each other is also influenced by an 
affective economy of attraction or repulsion (Lacan 2006). Nor is any symbolic object purely read—it is also loved 
or hated, or both ambivalently, or associated with contemplative disinterest, a rather unique affective economy in 
itself. 
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their experiential magnitude, the level of affective intensity or indifference. Thus, the study of 
discursive affects requires both a hermeneutical and a psychodynamic inquiry.12  
The analysis of the intersection of cognition and affect could be applied to other topics in 
sociology as well, such as collective memory, sexuality and desire, social movements and 
transformative events. Take the notion of ‘events’ as defined by William Sewell (1996) and 
others proposing a temporally sensitive eventful sociology. Sewell recognizes that cultural 
meanings and collective emotions are both essential conditions for the unfolding of a 
transformation in enduring structures. The very make-up of an event, as Sewell conceives of it, is 
partly cognitive and partly affective. Flows of affect can serve to make rhetoric and ideas spread 
faster and be more effective than they would otherwise be, facilitating the unfolding sequence of 
transformative collective action. In addition to values, mood, and symbolic boundaries then, 
evental cognitive-affective linkages deserve much more future research. 
 
III. Values 
 Contemporary sociology has not bestowed upon values the epistemic legitimacy they 
once held as an area of inquiry. Values were central to Talcott Parsons’s grand synthesis of 
utilitarianism and normativism into a general theory of action. Parsons defined values as 
conceptions of the desirable, operating as invisible instigators of action. With his colleagues in 
anthropology, societies were analyzed and compared according to the core values they 
expressed. Values were thought to be the organizing principles of social life. In sociological 
theory, values were the prime mover in explanations of action, motivation, and theories of 
socialization. Before I turn to the project of crafting a new theory of values, as cognitive-
affective linkages in the social order of culture—and not as psychological action implants—I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  The idea of an affective hermeneutics for this purpose is expanded in my section on mood below. 
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will show why values have fallen into disgrace in sociology, but also why many contemporary 
theorists are recently reconsidering their place. 
 In the fifties and sixties, critical sociologists questioned the supposed power of these 
cultural entities and the integrative function they served within Parsonian action theory. Since 
values are putatively invisible, perhaps this suggests that the social scientist is assuming, 
deductively and abstractly, their deep existence without adequate empirical inference, instead 
committing the logical fallacy of misattribution in value-based explanations of action (Spates 
1982 summarizes this line of criticism). After all, values may be post hoc rationalizations of self-
interested action. 
Then in 1986, Ann Swidler published her to-be-highly-cited article criticizing the 
presuppositions and implications of the “values paradigm” in sociological thought. Swidler 
identified several assumptions made, from Weber to Parsons, when defining culture primarily as 
values. Appropriating newer and textually thicker theories of culture, she could dismiss this as a 
type of cultural essentialism: culture qua abstract values. The values paradigm was also strongly 
determinist in its explanations of action. The “unit-act” in prior sociological theory, as Swidler 
called it, was mechanically made up of means and ends, the latter deciding the course of action. 
In the unit-act, values provided the normative ground, the telos, explaining human behavior like 
‘switchmen’ determine the train track.  
Swidler’s pragmatic-hermeneutic cultural theory eliminated the notion of values as 
invisible, internalized implants governing action. Instead, culture is conceptualized as bits and 
pieces of information, skills and know-how’s, that a culture-user can select according to 
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circumstantial demands. In some situations, culture may be an effective constraint upon action, 
but more frequently, culture is used as a post-hoc justification of situational conduct.13  
 With a pragmatic approach to values, as opposed to a deductive-functionalist one, a 
realistic appraisal could be made about the role of values in social life, no doubt including a 
reduction in their importance. However, many contemporary sociologists are proposing a more 
viable theory of values that moves beyond the cultural essentialism and normative determinism 
of the former values paradigm. The return of values in sociological theory can be seen in a 
rapidly expanding literature about them (Joas 2000, Alexander 2003, Bender 2003, Hitlin 2004, 
Gecas 2008, Szomptka 2009, Vaisey 2009).  
This new wave of theory stresses the mediation of the effect of values through situations, 
confirming Swidler’s basic argument. It emphasizes the ambivalent, fragmented nature of values, 
i.e. values do not crystallize into a coherent, discrete cultural wholes. Rather, contradictory 
valuations co-exist within the same culture without agents necessarily finding the inconsistency 
to be problematic (Thomson 2010). Values are one possible component of culture among many 
and sociological theory needs to take into account both the motivational and justificatory usages 
of culture (according to Stephen Vaisey’s dual-process model of culture, Vaisey 2009). With a 
distinctive style of structuralist hermeneutics, Jeffrey Alexander (2003) reconstructs values as 
binary oppositions between the good and the evil (or the pure v. the polluted). He argues that 
shared evaluative judgments of the good only emerge relationally from a conceptual system of 
antagonisms. Values are only meaningful and effective in relation to their classificatory opposite, 
the wicked and the wrong, hence Alexander’s neologism “antivalues” to capture the force of evil 
in a culture (Alexader 2003). Alexander also foregrounds the affective experience of both values 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Swidler’s argument was later echoed by the German social theorist, Hans Joas (1996) who continued to criticize 
the rationalist teleology—the a priori means-ends schema—in Parsonian action theory. Ironically, Parsons proposed 
his general theory as a normativist rejection of rational action models in sociology. 
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and antivalues. The new wave of value theory pays much more attention to the affective 
dimension of discourse.  
Why the resurgence of interest in values? One reason may be that the study of values 
offers an empirical-theoretical site to think beyond the cognitive bias in cultural theory, 
hermeneutic, pragmatic or otherwise. Values have essential cognitive and affective social 
components. Without the psychic and corporeal experience of emotional attachment to the good 
or revulsion toward moral threats, values would not be values. Both Charles Taylor (1989) and 
Hans Joas (2000) conceptualize values as emerging from an affective experience of something 
qualitatively different from routine experience. Values involve some sort of psychic charge or 
emotional intensity circulating around the social body.  
As social theorists increasingly challenge the cognitive bias derived from linguistic 
structuralism and hermeneutics in the 20th century, they start to appreciate the affective 
dimension of culture more, often with the aid of psychoanalytic theory. More cultural theorists 
are adding an affective dimension to their discourse analysis, for instance the notion of cathexis 
in cultural sociology (Alexander 2006) and the notion of ambivalence and disavowal in 
postcolonial social theory (Bhabha 2007). I propose that any future theory of values must make 
explicit their affective structure, their situationality, but also their dark side, i.e. how they are 
frequently invoked to justify violence or make sense of inequality.14  
 Values are a type of discursive affect. They emerge within a relational, conceptual space 
carved out by discursive formations. Even the stale Parsonian concept of a “value-orientation” 
understood that values are inherently relational. A value belongs to a more complex web of inter-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The theory I’m advancing applies to cultural values and not economic value. In economics, value refers to the 
worth of a commodity in market exchanges; this sort of value can be quantified. Cultural values, on the other hand, 
are not quantifiable; they typically refer to the moral worth of some common good as identified by a community. On 
the other hand, cultural values often determine the economic worth of something, as when it is sentimentalized 
(Zelizer 1985). 
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related values—that’s what a value-orientation is. Parsons’s formulation of “conceptions of the 
desirable” is worth retaining, but must be supplemented with recognition of the related 
conceptions of the feared or the morally threatening. Furthermore, values are more than mere 
conceptions; the very desirability of values indicates a peculiar discursive-psychic nexus of 
feeling. Values are a point of intersection between cognitive and affective dimensions. 
Consider for instance the relationship between values and violence, a frequent collusion 
most critically examined by postmodern and poststructural social theory. Why is it that the 
prototypical image we have of persons acting according to their values, rather than their self-
interests, is going to war? In war and terrorism, values motivate people to voluntarily sacrifice 
life for social causes largely unknown to them (Gecas 2008). The connection between values and 
violence is central to Jacques Derrida’s theory of centering and deconstruction (Derrida 1997). 
Deconstruction is a method of exposing how privileged interpretations or consensual values 
exclude difference.  Poststructuralists like Lacan and Derrida write about values in a very 
different language than most American sociologists, but the latter can appreciate their insight 
into subtle forms of power. Both Derrida’s ‘centers’ and Lacan’s ‘master signifiers’ (Lacan 
2006) deal with special nodes of discursive relations that motivate social agents through an 
imaginary wholeness or closure they desire. Such discursive centers, cognitively and affectively 
maintained, cannot be considered in isolation from the marginalization of differences.15  
 Values are not limited to the affectively charged call to arms though. As more recent 
value theory suggests, the effect of values upon human action varies according to context. In 
some contexts like war, values may transcend immediate needs and self-interests, but in other 
situations, values quickly take a backseat to other practical concerns (of course, this is true of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In American sociology, the cognitive-affective relationship between values and power can likewise be grasped by 
the theory of symbolic boundaries (Section V). Values and value-conflicts can become the symbolic basis of 
distinction between in-groups and out-groups, and they can motivate efforts to enforce these boundaries socially. 
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actual war experiences in many cases too). Recent empirical research has called into question 
how effective the moral pull of values really is. Some sociologists have persuasively argued that 
values are usually motivationally weak (Winchester and Hitlin 2010; Thomson 2010; Bender 
2003). Sociological theory must take into account the weakness, or situational dependence, of 
values without abandoning the study of them altogether. To summarize in terms of intellectual 
traditions here, understanding values requires cultural sociology to learn from psychoanalysis on 
the varying affective intensity of cognition and pragmatism on the situationality of all action. 
Briefly, I offer three meta-theoretical theses to move the sociology of values forward.  
  
1) Values are affectively unique and tend to be weak unless they are institutionalized. 
People often decide to betray their values due to group conformity and expected social 
consequences, e.g. obeying an authority figure despite one’s moral disagreement with the 
specific order at hand. In such cases, values are trumped by other situational norms. Winchester 
and Hitlin (2010) claim that the famous 1963 Milgram experiment in obedience and cruelty 
offers evidence of the weakness of values when they conflict with norms. This sobering 
experiment demonstrated that many pain-averse democratic citizens are willing to be cruel if the 
situation demands it. It also provides an instance wherein values and norms conflict with each 
other, which is not necessarily the case as when values have been institutionalized into rules and 
expectations. 
While norms and values may seem similar in their moral pull or push upon action, they 
are very different social things. In sociological theory, norms usually denote rules that tell an 
agent how to act appropriately at a particular time and venue. Norms are more specific and 
situational than values. Many norms sanctioned by social groups have no relation to values, such 
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as what colors to wear or what time to show up or how to say goodbye. Values, in contrast, are 
“trans-situational” (Schwartz 1994). They stay the same across different times and situations. A 
person can apply a value to many different situations, depending upon their practical reasoning 
(i.e. phronesis); the resultant actions are often very different thanks to the interpretive flexibility 
of values. Norms operate more in the manner of ‘do this’ ‘don’t do that’ depending on who one 
is with and where one is. In this sense, values are simpler than norms; values don’t have as many 
rules, clauses and qualifications. Values are simpler and more abstract, requiring situational 
mediation to determine which conduct best expresses the evaluative judgment, if other pressures 
don’t intervene. Values require translation into action, which can occur either in a conscious 
deliberative way or in a more unconscious way too (Vaisey 2009).    
The lived experience of norms and values also have affective differences. Norms trigger 
immediate, external consequences if you violate them, unlike the consequences of being 
indifferent to values. Norms probably require social sanctions to be effective, whereas values are 
effective because of how an individual experiences them. Values produce powerful feelings and 
a psychic-affective reaction that motivates an agent to a decision-making not based on the 
situational pressure to conform or the utilitarian rationale of avoiding bad consequences. A social 
theory of values requires hermeneutic and phenomenological sensitivity to the affective 
experience of something sacred or evil.  
 However, the relationship between values and norms gets complex because values can be 
institutionalized into norms. In his Three Society study, psychological anthropologist Roy 
D’Andrade (2008) argues that values have the most effective influence upon cross-national 
cultural character and societal action when they are institutionalized. Institutionalized values are 
not optional like personal values are and they may indeed have external consequences if they are 
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violated, because they have come to overlap with norms, roles and obligations. Values are more 
likely to be strong, enduring and motivationally relevant if they become institutionalized into 
civil society, government, family, etc. Studies in institutional isomorphism have made a similar 
argument, though Powell and DiMaggio (1983) prefer the language of ‘logics’ rather than 
‘values,’ and perhaps rightfully so because in institutionalization, the distinctive affective 
experience of values may be evacuated from organizational contexts. 
 
2) The influence of values is mediated by interpretive agency and other social 
constraints. 
Many examples could be provided of times when people with very different values 
engage in the exact same moral and political behavior. People with radically different value-
orientations can vote for the same presidential candidate, for instance, for different reasons. Pace 
Parsons and the values paradigm, this implies that values cannot explain everything, namely why 
people with different values would do the same thing. Sociologist Courtney Bender (2003) 
observes this fact from her ethnography of volunteers working in a non-profit kitchen devoted to 
cooking home-delivered meals for persons with AIDS. She found out that some of the volunteers 
were religious and religiously motivated in their reasons for volunteering, and some were 
secular, appealing to non-religious humanist values. Yet, religious and secular minded volunteers 
shared the same moral goals, namely, charity and getting the meals out on time.  
Values are only loosely related to behavior—action does not automatically follow from 
holding certain values. The inverse is also true: people with the same values can have very 
different moral behaviors. Two social agents sharing the same Puritan hard-working values may 
have different attitudes toward unemployment and thus different feelings when they lose their 
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job. Some may blame the individual as part of a moral panic toward the unemployed poor; others 
may identify the lack of economic opportunities and perceive a wider tragedy of talent going to 
waste. The same value is interpreted in two different ways, and can lead to different courses of 
action. This fact has led Thomson (2010) to describe the “loose connection” or a “loose 
coupling” between culture and action. Cultural values have to be interpreted by actors and thus 
their effect on action is always mediated by a host of other social things.   
 
3) Values emerge from discursive relations that can be contradictory and ambivalent. 
The social sciences have periodically proposed that humans are rational and coherent 
beings when it comes to managing their values and making decisions based on their values, a 
view certainly encouraged by economics but also by Weberian hermeneutics and rational choice 
theory. From these schools of theory, sociologists still today assume that social agents will try to 
avoid cognitive dissonance by either changing their beliefs to fit their actions or changing their 
actions to fit their beliefs. It turns out, however, that people can believe and do contradictory 
things without feeling any cognitive dissonance whatsoever. The same is true with values: values 
that are logically incompatible with each other, between tradition and openness-to-change, or 
between independence and conformism, can be held and strategically managed by the same 
individual (Swidler 1986). Social agents are capable of retaining two ‘incompatible’ values by 
selecting which value to activate and when according to the situation. Similarly, values can be 
ambivalent when an agent possess two contradictory attitudes toward a value simultaneously due 
to wider discursive relations.16 For example, self-reliant individualism may be a prime value in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ambivalence, in psychoanalysis, described transferential relationships in which both love and hatred are intensely 
felt at the same time. 
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discursive formation that simultaneously denigrates “excessive” individualism, too much of it 
being a bad thing (Thomson 2010).  
Recent research makes a compelling case for not overestimating the strength of values 
and for the theory that values are only “loosely connected” to action and behavior. Maybe the 
weakness of values is relatively new to individualistic societies, an argument made by Robert 
Bellah and his colleagues (1985). Or maybe values were never really that strong, always being 
mediated by situations tempering their affective force or, in some cases, preventing the 
escalation of value conflicts into violence. Either way, the science of values is evolving to do 
justice to their distinctive cognitive and affective dimensions. Values were once thought to 
govern societies and dictate how people lived, but as the concept of culture shifted from an 
Essence to a Text in the social sciences, so values became understood as one kind of cognitive-
affective linkage participating in and delimited by a complex discursive-social order.  
 
IV. Mood 
 Mood is a distinctive kind of affect, contrastable to emotions. Psychology has long tried 
to explicate the nature of mood ever since Edith Jacobsen and Sylvan Tomkins. Psychological 
theory and current social psychology distinguish between mood and emotions on the basis of the 
former’s ambiguity and diffuseness. Emotions are situational feeling-dispositions toward specific 
objects or interlocutors and the cause of the feeling is often clear. An emotion like ‘anger’ at x 
differs from a more diffuse mood of ‘irritability.’ The precipitating events that give rise to a 
mood are often unknown and not cognitively identifiable by the affected person.  
Several psychologists claim that mood is a state of feeling disconnected from an 
individual’s usage of emotion labeling (Morris 1989; Siemer 2009). In their “arousal plus 
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cognition” theory of emotions, mood exists as a primitive activation of the affective system of 
arousal without consciousness of the feeling. The cognitive system remains inactivated. If this 
would seem to imply a natural neurological separation of cognition and affect, the psychology of 
mood instead goes on to observe how the affective state of moods can shape perceptions of the 
external world in a totalizing way. Moods are “global,” meaning they have a psychological 
pervasive quality influencing perception, memory, and decisions—virtually one’s entire 
relationship with the object-world. 
 The concept of mood as temporary, totalizing feeling-states has some affinity with the 
sociology of collective emotions from Durkheim to Jaspers. Psychologists of mood though 
wrongly neglected the possibility of this socially shared experiential component since they 
focused more on the individual experience of mood, mood-swings and mood-enhancing drugs. 
The dominance of the “arousal plus cognition” paradigm in the theory of mood also falsely 
separated affect and cognition in regards to the genesis of the mood, because it considers “mood-
precipitating events” to be exogenous to affective experience (Morris 1989). When these events 
are excluded from the theory of mood, it is easier to think of mood as just some pure abstract 
state of arousal without character. Although mood indeed has an unconscious or automatic 
character in response to events—unidentified by the agent—the cognitive constitution of these 
mood-inducing events is highly relevant to the affective character of the actual mood 
experience.17  
The cognitive component of mood stems directly from the historical, temporal events that 
unknowingly cause it, whether on a daily or epochal plane. But ‘events’ themselves are culturally 
and affectively constituted. Thus, the arousal of mood has cultural contours relative to a certain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Paul DiMaggio distinguishes between automatic and deliberate cognitions in his essay, “Culture and Cognition” 
(1997). 
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place and time, much like the concept of ‘structure of feeling’ implies for British cultural studies 
(Williams 1977). The relationship between mood and culture is developed further in the 
symbolic anthropology of Clifford Geertz. Geertz inherited an existential psychology of mood 
from his philosophical reading, particularly from writings of Gilbert Ryle (1949) and Martin 
Heidegger (1962, 1996) before him. The state of mood research today does not offer the 
empirical wealth that the new sociology of values did above. For this reason, I spend more time 
examining theoretical precedents before offering a few theses advancing the study of collective 
mood. 
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973) is not typically seen as a theorist of affect. Yet, if 
we are willing to accept that human life is saturated with affects, periodically and chronically, 
and if ‘thick description’ involves hovering close to the ethnographic context, then it is not 
surprising that Geertz would frequently observe collective emotions or mood even while he 
unraveled the conceptual logic of symbol systems. Consider his appreciation for the subtleties of 
affective valences across diverse cultures: 
The endurance, courage, independence, perseverance, and passionate willfulness 
in which the vision quest practices the Plains Indian are the same flamboyant 
virtues by which he attempts to life…The consciousness of defaulted obligation, 
secreted guilt, and, when a confession is obtained, public shame in which Manus’ 
séance rehearses him are the same sentiments that underlie the sort of duty ethic 
by which his property-conscious society is maintained…And the same self-
discipline which rewards a Javanese mystic staring fixedly into the flame of a 
lamp with what he takes to be an intimation of divinity drills him in that rigorous 
control of emotional expression which is necessary to a man who would follow a 
quietistic style of life (95). 
 
In The Interpretation of Cultures, the best discussion of discursive affects, including the passage 
above, can be found in his essays on religion, especially the well-circulated “Religion As a 
Cultural System,” in which he approaches religion as a symbol system that welds together an 
ethos with a worldview.  
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 Every religion has two dimensions for Geertz, a cosmic framework and a moral-
aesthetic-affective ethos. Religion excels at fusing together metaphysics with a set of powerful 
feelings: “sacred symbols function to synthesize a people’s ethos—the tone, character, and 
quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood—and their worldview—the picture 
they have of the way things in sheer actuality are” (89). Emotions like humble reverence or 
divine hatred belong to the ethos or mood of a religious culture. While Geertz claims that the 
“symbolic fusion of ethos and world view” is most effectively accomplished through religion 
and its communal-ceremonial rituals, he recognizes that this fusion can be seen elsewhere too. 
He identifies a secular collective mood in the worry felt during “the hanging threat of nuclear 
holocaust” (98).  
For Geertz, mood is an emotional fog or climate relative to specific cultures. It primarily 
varies by the intensity of feeling, coming and going “for often quite unfathomable reasons” (97). 
Induced by symbol systems, moods are the shared affects present in different cultural orders, 
each of which is a constellation of feelings like shame, tranquility, melancholy or exuberance. 
Geertz champions the cultural relativity and diversity of collective moods, the number of which 
is, like its attached metaphysical conceptions, limitless in principle.18 The relativity and 
specificity of mood provides a rationale for studying the interconnections between culture and 
affect rather than for the classification of a few fundamental emotions in isolation from their 
historically conditioned background meanings as some psychologists would have it. 
 Moods are “like fogs, they just settle and lift” (97), Geertz continues the climate analogy, 
a set of advantageous metaphors because it “gets [psychological forces] out of any dim and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Instead of offering a universal classification of possible emotions, Geertz emphasizes the “thoroughly singular 
figurations of fear and gaiety” in the Balinese ritual (122) and that “the sorts of moods and motivations which 
characterize a man who has just come from an Aztec human sacrifice are rather different from those of one who has 
just put off his Kachina mask” (123). 
   29 
inaccessible realm of private sensation into that same well-lit world of observables in reside the 
brittleness of glass…and, to return to the metaphor, the dampness of England” (96, emphasis 
mine). To define moods, Geertz achieves representational transparency only through great figural 
wit. Moods are “like scents, suffuse and evaporate” he goes on, and throughout the essay, he 
expands the metaphor supplementing it with music motifs as well: words like tone, tenor, and 
tuning enable him, if nothing else, to point to the affective dimension within the semiotic.  
Geertz writes that motivation is “vectoral,” whereas mood is “scalar” (97). Though 
affectively experienced, motivations are purposive dispositions in Geertz’s account, involving a 
liability to act with certain feelings in certain situations toward certain ends. Mood though has to 
be interpreted differently, namely “with reference to the conditions from which they are 
conceived to spring” as opposed to interpretation through teleological-rational intelligibility. 
“We interpret moods in terms of their sources” (97). Hence a reverential worshipful mood can 
spring from divine encounters; an anxious mood of worry can stem from the mass-media 
amplified apocalypse—the affective character of moods springs from the cultural constitution of 
events. Moods are always culturally specific, being induced by the logic of symbol systems.  
 One of the main attributes of a mood for Geertz is its variable intensity. A specific mood, 
whether euphoric or fearful, can become so strong that it totally transforms one’s experience and 
attitude toward the world. Mood adds a scalar quality of magnitude to the semiotic analysis of 
culture: symbols can be experienced more powerfully through the affective mechanism of mood. 
In observing and analyzing culturally specific moods, we enter an alternative theoretical 
language-game not reducible to semiotics, and this fact might account for some of Geertz’s 
figural complexity. Geertz seems to be adding a dimension of meaningfulness to his usual 
analysis of meaning. While moods are semantically circumscribed, they add another dimension 
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internal to textual semantics, i.e. a level of psychological intensity or a heightening of 
experience. Moods operate like the everyday equivalent to a musical score in cinema. One is 
absorbed by affective mechanisms into a meaningful world amplified in magnitude. As we will 
see, for this reason, the sociological study of moods requires both hermeneutic and 
psychodynamic methods. 
 Human perceptions are both culturally and affectively constructed. Geertz elaborates, “if 
one is sad everything and everybody seems dreary; if one is gay, everything and everybody 
seems splendid” (97). If culture and affect are co-constitutive of the social world, they 
nevertheless have different world-creative functions. The meaningfulness-function of affect 
complements and supplements culture’s meaning-function. The latter blankets the world with a 
“lunar-light” or tint, a variation in contrast or brightness, though it is still in some sense 
“derivative”—Geertz’s word—upon the specific meaning-functions of a semiotic system, 
religious or not. Mood in its meaningfulness-function serves to make culture more powerful and 
vivid to human subjects through its heightening or dampening of symbolic action. Affect 
promotes a worldview by making it more emotionally convincing. In this scheme, culture still 
gives perception its specific content and affect adds hue and intensity; affects are still 
discursively organized or culturally channeled.   
While improving upon his predecessors, Geertz’s theory of mood is indebted to the 
existential philosophy of Martin Heidegger, whom we should consider here for his reflections on 
the cognitive-affective constitution of the world.19 The centrality of mood in social life is one of 
the less appreciated motifs in Being and Time. Heidegger devoted two early sections (29 and 30) 
on ‘attunement’ (Befindlichkeit) and ‘mood’ (Stimmung). Attunement is also sometimes 
translated as a ‘state-of-mind’ and it refers to a more ordinary sense of ‘how one finds oneself.’  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 I use both the Macquarrie and Robinson and the newer Stambaugh translations of Being and Time. 
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Attunement is an ontological structure of Dasein20 for Heidegger, which makes possible 
determinate moods. Heidegger writes that “ontologically mood is a primordial kind of Being for 
Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition…We are never 
free of moods” (1962:175). Affects prefigure the world by orienting or facing the human being in 
certain directions (1996:129). Heidegger agrees that moods are totalistic: they consist of global 
attitudes affecting one’s whole experience. Moods are evidence of our human ‘throwness’ into a 
world, for Heidegger, because Dasein’s perception of the environment is always already caught 
within a prior meaningful world disclosed and conditioned by affects and the understanding. This 
is part of Heidegger’s critique of the analytical theoretical language of other philosophers, whose 
efforts to explicate the world through derivative scientific languages, he thinks, is futile. 
Heidegger the existentialist also argues that most moods distract Dasein from the proper question 
of its Being with the notable exception of the mood of Angst.  
The Heideggerian philosophy of affect notoriously rejects projectivist theories of emotion 
that posit affects as subjective, inward states having nothing to do with an affect-neutral world. 
He insists that affects actually do construct ‘worlds’ because mood is a core part of the 
existential constitution of Dasein in its being-in. Moods are different ways of being-in-the-world 
that stimulate a passive ‘surrendering’ of Dasein to what it encounters—the ‘there.’ Hence, 
Heidegger writes, “the mood brings Dasein before the ‘that-it-is’ of its ‘there’” (1962:175). 
Moods condition human perception, as Geertz realized, but in an even more fundamental way for 
Heidegger. Dasein’s usage of ready-to-hand objects in everyday routines is profoundly 
dependent upon the orientations that moods provide. “When we see the ‘world’ in an unsteady 
and wavering way in accordance with our moods, what is at hand shows itself in its specific 
worldliness, which is never the same on any given day” (1996:130). Moods, such as fear, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 “Dasein” is untranslated German for the ‘there being,’ Heideggers neologism for talking about human nature. 
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boredom or joy, restrict Dasein’s possibilities of perception of the world, much like looking 
through tinted glasses restricts possibilities of color.  
Heidegger suggests that affect is the condition of the possibility of cultural significance. 
Moods are “disclosive” (1962:177)—they determine how things matter to Dasein. “Mood has 
always already disclosed being-in-the-world as a whole and first makes possible directing 
oneself toward something” (1996:129). The mattering of objects, cognitively or aesthetically, is 
primordially affective. Even a theoretical stance toward nature or the social world inevitably 
participates in some sort of affective state, albeit a measure of tranquility or contemplation 
(1996:130). Heidegger-inspired philosophers such as Charles Taylor (1989) likewise posit a 
close relationship between culture and affect. Taylor inherits from Heidegger the motif of 
‘mattering’ as a general ontological feature of human beings. What ‘matters’ is of cultural 
significance or morally valuable. Attunement is a feature of Dasein’s being-in-the-world that 
makes possible the mattering of certain objects. 
Heidegger’s existentialism however lacks the sensitivity to how specific moods are 
culturally channeled and the subsequent multiplicity of moods that Geertz theorizes better. 
Geertz’s cultural anthropology locates moods within the cultural equipment of a society, 
enabling him to draw concrete linkages between the cognitive contents of cultural worldviews 
and shared affects like ethos or mood. Both thinkers highlight the promise of theorizing affective 
channels and flows with a relational, social ontology. If Geertz mostly placed moods internal to 
the cultural system, albeit in a different dimension, Heidegger grounds the possibility of culture, 
religion and morality in the affective structure of Dasein.  
I suspect there is a substantive reason why the concept of collective mood has been most 
fully considered by the tradition of hermeneutics, whether in Geertz’s interpretive social science 
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or in Heidegger’s philosophical hermeneutics. What is the nature of collective mood such that it 
requires both a psychodynamic and interpretive approach? 
 
 1) Collective mood has a hermeneutic structure.  
Classical hermeneutics thought that the meaning of a text could be made apparent from a 
hermeneutic circle relating preconceptions of the whole to textual parts ad infinitum. So too 
collective mood emerges from the complex relationships between discursive structures of 
meaning and social-historical situations. The emotional temperature, character and magnitude of 
mood depends upon the historical events and structures of meaning conditioning it. Moods have 
a conjunctural ontology: they can emerge from a unique combination of symbol systems, 
economic forecasts, political failures and surrenders, new alarming social risks and looming 
catastrophes, levels of trust or distrust in authorities, emotional cultures, theological 
interpretations of history, new cultural scripts and widely believed myths, etc. Each of these can 
go into forming a hermeneutical historical experience shared by a generation of people or more 
specific participants of social events.  
Moods are historically thick, thus Geertz the ethnographer was more sensitivity to their 
multiplicity than Heidegger. Theoretically, a collective mood of some sort should always be 
present like the aesthetic or musical accompaniment of historical events. They exist and shade 
the social perceptions of their day in unconscious ways, just as the psychologists of mood 
asserted the unconscious influence of mood-inducing events upon arousal without the activation 
of deliberative cognitions. However, the affective intensity of a collective mood can vary across 
the population according a group’s relation to alternative sources of affect and/or the group’s 
level of cognizance or interactional resonance with the mood-constitutive events. 
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 Moods are not necessarily a perfect fit with socio-structural reality. Despite the 
continuing international power of the U.S., which will most likely continue for several decades, 
the end of America has already been pronounced. For those who read newspapers and attend 
university classes, they are likely to have felt this mood of American declinism. Declinism is a 
significant affective twist in the American public mood considering the nation’s historical 
inclination toward optimism, civil religion and exceptionalism. A widespread emotional shift 
toward pessimism and resignation is quite an abrupt shift away from the affective-social 
character described by de Tocqueville in the 1830s. While the current prophets of declinism may 
be putting the cart before the horse, their hermeneutics certainly make sense of several critical 
events of the first decade of the 21st century: 9/11, the ‘war on terror’ and the enlargement of 
C.I.A. operations and surveillance, Hurricane Katrina, Abu Ghraib coverage in the media, the 
lack of success in Afghanistan, the great financial crash of 2008 and subsequent recession, 
unprecedented disapproval ratings of Congress, to name only the darkest events. The enduring, 
transformative implications of these events in American history is still unclear, but their negative 
affective valence has already arrived and been spread through the public sphere. The mood of 
American resignation emerges hermeneutically from these recent historical events.  
 
 2) The social experience of collective mood is shaped by discursive-social conflicts and 
inequalities. 
 Overcoming a bias toward solidarity and integration in cultural theory, Geertz (1973) 
famously wrote that culture can be a source of social conflict just as frequently as it reinforces 
communal cohesion. A theory of collective mood likewise needs to take power and inequalities 
into account to explain the variability of a mood experience, its intensity and character, across a 
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population. Clearly, collective moods are not one-to-one with a community or a culture. Moods 
can criss-cross and overlap across societies. Two alternative moods can be experienced by 
different portions of the population for socio-demographic reasons, such as class, race or age. 
Moods intersect with inequalities. 
 There can be a politics of mood when collective emotions are manipulated by the 
conscious or unconscious strategies of elites. A mood can be amplified by politicians, the mass 
media, activists, and interests groups, each delivering emotionally saturated scripts to wider 
audiences. There are many different sources of affect-influence within modern society. It follows 
then that one’s experience of mood will significantly depend upon one’s relationship to different 
sources of affect. For instance, those who watch more television and/or read newspapers are 
much more likely to have experienced the “war on terror” mood of the U.S. (the first decade of 
the 21st century, perhaps longer). Television is a dominant ‘spring’ of collective moods for large 
portions of the population: those who watch more television are also more likely to experience a 
conservative mood of national patriotism than those who watch less or none at all (Phillips 
1996).   
 When moods become political, not always case throughout history, they can facilitate 
self-identifications with social groups and the collective mobilization of identity markers. Like 
values and symbolic boundaries, moods are a cognitive-affective linkage that constitute and can 
be used by subjects. The experience of a particular mood may facilitate making other related 
affective attachments to identities, to nationality, or to social institutions.  
 
3) Studying collective mood requires a synthesis of hermeneutics and psychodynamic 
inquiry. 
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Whence the methodology for the study of collective moods? More than any other science, 
sociology explicitly recognizes the need for methodological pluralism: the nature of the object 
studied should influence the selection of methods. In the case of collective moods, then, how 
does the affective dimension morph social inquiry?  
This question returns to the problem and possibility of an affective hermeneutics. What is 
‘understood’ in the empirical study a specific collective mood? Another benefit of my proposed 
meta-theory of discursive affects is the historicization and transcendence of the problem of 
rationality in the social sciences. As we saw in the new sociology of values, the rationalistic 
action schema of means-ends prevented an ontological understanding of the situationality and 
emotionality of values (Joas 1995). In the case of collective mood, especially, the rationality bias 
plagues hermeneutic inquiry itself. Collective moods are difficult to study because the 
interpretive methodology of the social sciences has long been governed by a normative 
prescription of rationality. The verstehen approach of Weberian hermeneutics restricts our 
understanding action to understanding the rationality of action (Goldthorpe 1998). This corrupts 
the study of cultural structures with a bias toward strategies and teleology, but it also damages 
the potential objectual-theoretical construction of collective mood.  
Mood requires an affective hermeneutics that matches its cognitive and affective 
ontological structure. Only an affective hermeneutics can escape the prescriptive rationality of 
interpretive sociology. Only it can break with the notion that cultural usage and constraints must 
be rendered as strategic action to informed actors. An affective hermeneutics examines how 
social perceptions and drives are affectively structured by cultural meanings.  
Interpretation can render the feelings of an action context intelligible without relying 
upon teleological rationality or upon causal narratives. To give an example, I will consider the 
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recent and highly suggestive proposal of one contemporary sociological theorist. Andrew Abbott 
(2007) has developed a sort of affective hermeneutics, coining ‘lyrical sociology’ to describe a 
more affect-sensitive research program. Lyrical sociology’s “ultimate, framing structure should 
not be the telling of a story—recounting, explaining, comprehending—but rather the use of a 
single image to communicate a mood, an emotional sense of reality” (2007:73, emphasis mine). 
Communicating mood, in all their cognitive and affective specificity, is a goal of an affective 
hermeneutics. Despite his mid-career ‘narrative positivism,’ here Abbott has resolutely 
abandoned causal explanations and path-dependency for a new mode of temporality in 
sociological writing: the momentary, emerging from a dialectic between transient perceptions 
and the more enduring affective properties of a cultural landscape.  
Abbott’s affective hermeneutics elevate the importance of sociological writing and the 
rhetorical techniques of communication, to examine how authors can actually transfer a sense of 
a mood’s character to their audience. The momentary ‘state of being’ at a particular time and 
place must be rendered vividly by a lyrical sociology, inseparably fusing the action context with 
the authorial context. Communicating feelings through affective hermeneutics requires much 
more attention to the author’s experience and expression of a collective mood. Abbott is right to 
point to the style of writing itself since far too much sociology and anthropology, including 
Geertz’s thick descriptions, continues to aim at inter-contextual transparency without 
recognizing the necessary mediation of embodied writing, including the author’s psychic-
affective experiences. A sociology of affect and moods must reflect upon the rhetorical 
production of empathy through imaginative writing styles.  
 
 
 
 
   38 
 
V. Symbolic Boundaries 
 Symbolic boundaries are the last cognitive-affective linkage considered in this essay. 
This concept is included in my meta-theoretical synthesis for several reasons. One, it has wide-
ranging applicability in many different areas and schools of theory in the social sciences. Two, it 
also provides an empirical site for interrogating the relationship between cognitive-affective 
hybrids and other important social processes of power, social inequality and identity (though we 
have already seen the importance of violence and social inequalities to the theory of values and 
collective mood). Once again, I will argue for an approach that combines the historicism and 
relationality of discourse theory with a psychoanalytic appreciation of bodily affects.  
Symbolic boundaries are powerful cognitive and affective group processes. They have a 
central function in shaping perception, identity and experiences of selfhood through culturally 
defined, unequal relationships of likeness and difference. In contemporary sociological theory, 
symbolic boundaries have focused on the accumulation and transmission of “cultural capital,” 
associated with the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Michele Lamont (1992; Lamont and Fournier 
1992). As expounded by Bourdieu, habitual markers of distinction, through consumption and 
other customs, enable high-status classes to self-promote and recognize themselves in the social 
reproduction of stratification. Adding to this school of theory, my framework for analyzing 
symbolic boundaries will also borrow, again, from poststructural social theory—in Judith 
Butler’s theory of the discursive and affective constitution of subjects—and from studies  of 
cognitive-affective linkages in nationalism and national feeling—drawing upon the work of 
Benedict Anderson (1991) and Rogers Brubaker (2009). Lastly, I conclude with several positive 
theses about the role of symbolic boundaries in subjectivity, group identity, and inequality. 
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  In the broadest sense, symbolic boundaries are the classifications of people and things by 
the ordering agency of discourse. They are categories or schemata of likeness and difference, 
grouping some people together to the exclusion of others. While these ordering relationships of 
inclusion and exclusion are applied to nearly every natural thing, sociologists more frequently 
use the term to explain the social interactions and segregations of people. In this sense, symbolic 
boundaries refer to shared identifications of self (singular or plural) and dis-identifications with 
others.21 The concept of them is used to advocate a non-essentialist, relational understanding of 
collective identity. Status, gender, nationality and ethnicity are not pregiven features of the social 
world, rather they emerge from the activity of distinction via boundary drawing.  
The formation of social identities occurs through othering. Michael Schwalbe et al (2000) 
defines ‘othering’ as a process whereby a dominant group brings into public existence an inferior 
group. Othering involves the use of identity markers and codes to signify membership into a 
group. This process of forming status distinctions against others can even be seen in scientific 
practices, when scientists anxiously distinguish empirical knowledge from metaphysics, religion 
or “pseudo-sciences.” Schwalbe rightly recognizes the processual and relational nature of 
collective identity, that selfhood emerges in relation to the other. But the performative nature of 
othering must also be noted. The use of symbolic boundaries to privilege one’s group identity via 
othering may succeed or fail. Symbolic boundaries are not automatically effective as social-
hierarchical divisions. Their materialization requires performative articulation by groups, which 
can be challenged even when it is successful.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Paul Lichterman (2008) describes this social process as a collective “mapping.” Through mapping, civil 
groups and social movements define their relationship to their environment and to various audiences. Mapping 
includes both the internal and external sides of boundary drawing: conceptions about what members share within the 
group and how members place the group in relation to out-groups. For Lichterman, boundary drawing or mapping is 
a core social factor that mediates between cultural repertoires—religious knowledge and know-how in his case 
studies—and a group’s identity (I will expand upon this point in my second thesis below). 
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Poststructural social theory argues that we must recognize the inevitable exclusions 
produced by any identity category serving as a source of solidarity, whether nationality or human 
rights. In identity performances, subjects appeal to discourse to the peril of others rendered non-
intelligible by it. Becoming a subject demands a form of centering and marginalization, i.e., 
gaining subjectivity requires denying that property to others. Feminist social theorists like 
Kristeva and Butler describe how subjectivity depends upon the “constitutive exclusion” of 
abjection. The abject is expelled and then repelled, i.e. discursively rendered as other and then 
displaced as the object of intense emotional dislike or fear (Butler 1990:182). Social power is 
thus not primarily between pregiven actors competing for pregiven resources. Instead, power 
discursively constitutes the subject and its others. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) likewise ground 
their social ontology on the inherent negativity and indeterminateness of the world: my 
subjectivity is threatened by the subjectivity of others. The social field consists of constitutive 
antagonisms upon which subjects struggle to articulate themselves through symbols and 
boundaries.  
 We can see here how affects are not so much felt by individuals as that individuals are 
affectively produced. Subjectification depends upon affective attachments that are discursively 
structured. Of these attachments, the protection of socially shared boundaries is paramount. 
Boundary work conditions subjectivity on at least two levels: social identities, to which one can 
be a member, and personhood, how a culture distinguishes between the self and the other and 
between subjects and objects. Social identities include gender, race and ethnicity, civic and 
religious groups, nationality, etc. Personhood, on the other hand, refers to the form of self-
consciousness and the sense of having a self or status as a subject. It can overlap or intersect with 
social identities, but Western discursive formations circumscribe it as a property within the 
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individual body, a specific symbolic-boundary formation which should not be universalized.22 
On both levels, the maintenance of symbolic boundaries links cognitive cultural structures to the 
affective constitution of subjectivity. The sociology of symbolic boundaries has tended to focus 
on social identities, but other theorists have argued that even the bodily borders of selfhood are 
culturally variable. 
 For instance, symbolic anthropologists like Mary Douglas (1966) and Marshall Sahlins 
(1976) have long been aware of the operation of symbolic boundaries upon the body. In their 
writings can be found an implicit realization of the intersection between cognition and affect in 
boundary drawing processes. Douglas observes the repulsiveness of the anomalous object that 
violates cultural classification systems. Both aboriginal and modern societies institute pollution 
rituals to cognitively-affectively manage chaos and the unclean according to a cultural order. The 
body likewise becomes a symbol of social boundaries with bodily orifices representing symbolic 
danger.  
Judith Butler (1990) radicalizes the connection that Douglas finds between the body and 
boundaries. Butler argues that the body is not just a symbol of social boundaries, but that bodily 
boundaries are themselves products of the cultural order and its “regulatory grid of 
intelligibility.” Symbolic boundaries have a central constitutive role in the production of identity: 
subjectivity is the signifying practice of the body identifying and placing markers on the body. 
These bodily significations are always specific to a discursive regime of power, a grid of 
classifications reiterated in identity performances. Butler’s poststructuralist theory recognizes 
multiple levels of symbolic boundaries: the body, the subject, and one’s race or gender or other 
social identities—all of these intersecting with each other and constituted by specific discursive 
formations.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 I pick up this argument again in my third thesis below. 
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 The sociological analysis of national identity and nationalism has been crucial to the 
development of the theory of symbolic boundaries and is touched upon here insofar as it 
illustrates the collective intersection between cognition and affect. According to Benedict 
Anderson, national ideologies are based on an imagination of fellow citizens, as one’s temporal 
partners, and a commitment to boundaries that are geographically and linguistically defined. In 
Anderson’s historical account of the rise of national consciousness, “imagined communities” are 
cognitive and affective states of social being. Nationalness consists of both a transformation in 
collective consciousness—toward empty calendrical temporal simultaneity—and shared feelings 
of solidarity between members of the nation whom have never actually meet. National citizens 
are aware of each other and feel “complete confidence in [each other’s] steady, anonymous, 
simultaneous activity,” a collective self-consciousness partially made possible by the modern 
literary conventions of novels and newspapers (1991:26). Anderson’s intent is to explain how the 
deep “emotional legitimacy” of nationality came about to such an extent that now the nation is 
universally modular across the globe (1991:4).  
National affects emerged from several social changes in the economy and 
transformations in culture. According to Anderson, the primary sacrosanct object of national 
affective attachments is language. His narrative shows how print-capitalism gave rise to quasi-
vernacular print-languages in European metropoles and the many colonies of the 16th and 17th 
centuries. Despite the modernity of print-languages, they are naturalized as the nation’s 
primordial past and ground. Anderson writes that “nothing connects us affectively to the dead 
more than language” (1991:145). Shared language, not blood relations, is the basis of the 
nation’s invented ethnicity.  
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The fictitiousness of ethnic nationalism does not decrease the deep “attachments that 
people feel for the inventions of their imaginations” (1991:141). The supposed disinterested 
purity of the nation motivates self-sacrifice and military service. Patriotism, a complex cognitive-
affective formation in itself, springs from the “aura of finality” surrounding national boundaries. 
These boundaries between modern nations are primarily linguistic as seen in collective affective 
attachments to the national language readily observable in anthems and patriotic poetry. To re-
phrase Anderson’s thesis in expressions of contemporary sociology, linguistic capital is the 
relational basis of national distinction and ethnic boundary drawing work.  
Generalizing a theory of cognitive-affective linkages from Anderson’s seminal work, we 
could say that national affects are suspended between economies, ideologies and political 
powers. Economic conditions of print-capitalism were a necessary cause of nationalism and 
seem to be the primary causal mover in Anderson’s history. Anderson sees no need to comply 
with traditional dichotomies between economy and culture though, and to their mutual 
embeddedness, he adds the affective dimension. Although shared affects are rarely autonomous 
causal agents in themselves, i.e. from discourse, politics and the economy, that is no reason to 
impoverish our conceptions of social life by taking them out of the equation. In Anderson’s 
analysis, shared affects are discursively and technologically dependent and thus thoroughly 
historical in nature, even manipulable as an instrument of power. Anderson describes how, at 
first, dynastic-feudal monarchs found nationalism and feelings of nationalness useful in 
extending their power—he calls this “official nationalism”—before eventually the egalitarian-
horizontal nature of the ideology eventually pulled the carpet out from under them. The meta-
theory of cognitive-affective linkages is intended to be agile enough to competently deal with the 
multiplex interactions between culture, the economy and politics, and I offer it to help 
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sociological theory catch up with already charted historical-empirical realities like the affective 
experience of national boundary drawing   
 For over a decade now, Rogers Brubaker (2009; Brubaker and Cooper 2000) has been 
arguing against substantialist notions of identity. He makes a persuasive case that ‘identity’ 
should be replaced with the word ‘identification,’ among other more dynamic sounding words, in 
order to emphasize the active and processual nature of identity-formation. He has applied this 
insight to the study of ethnicity and nationality in particular. Identification with ethnic or national 
cognitive schemata is a highly affective psychodynamic process. Agents draw upon boundaries 
and other markers to bind together groups with varying levels of “groupness.” Sociologists, 
therefore, should not take any identity group for granted as a pregiven unit, because group 
formation is variable in its success, based on how tightly cognitive-affective linkages are 
interwoven. Brubaker’s theory of identification is valuable for bringing out the collective and the 
processual development of cognitive-affective linkages. 
A further implication of Brubaker’s work is the inseparability of sociological and 
psychological theory. Despite the disciplinary anxiety of sociology’s own boundary-work, 
bracketing out psychological processes from sociological analysis can misconstrue the 
phenomena at stake, as in the reifications of a sociology of identity without identification, or in a 
theory that naturalizes ethnicity apart from ethno-racial boundary processes or that theorizes the 
nation without nationalism and national feeling. Brubaker is right to defend a “psychodynamic” 
perspective, and sociologists could do worse than reconsidering Freud’s original group 
psychology as a neglected classic in a social psychology of this sort. In that work (Freud 1959), 
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Freud explains feelings of membership through social-psychological dynamics of introjection 
and idealization.23  
 
1) Symbolic boundaries are arbitrarily defined by discourse 
 Discursive structures of meaning make categories and classify people and things within 
those categories. Symbolic boundaries in the broadest sense merely refer to the meaningful, 
ordering relationships promoted by discourse, boundaries distinguishing what fits in a category 
from what is excluded. Symbolic boundaries are the relationships made intelligible by these 
categories, not always being about persons though often they are.  
This broad understanding of symbolic boundaries is not necessarily connected to social 
relations of power: color categories or numerical categories, though they can become vehicles of 
social distinction, are not in themselves imbued with power. On the other hand, many social 
theorists agree that all inequalities in the social world, whether by class or gender stratification 
or ethno-racial discrimination, are based on the discursive power of symbolic boundaries. 
Assenting with this proposition also affirms that inequalities are not natural. They are the product 
of arbitrary structures of meaning, namely the categories of people they specify as superior or 
inferior. To summarize: not all symbolic boundaries are sources of inequality, especially 
categories not dealing with people, but all social inequalities are grounded upon symbolic 
boundaries. Person-making symbolic boundaries construct subjects with or without status. 
 The sociology of symbolic boundaries thus has a critical thrust to it. It seeks to de-
naturalize inequalities by uncovering their cultural grounding in a conceptual system of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Introjection is a psychological condition of feelings of group solidarity. It occurs when individuals internalize 
their social bonds with other group members. Idealization is responsible for charisma and obedience to authority. It 
is a process of collective cathexis, when a leader or a leading idea is simultaneously cathected by multiple egos. 
Freud develops a such mechanics for explicating the psychodynamic intersection of cognition and affect, even doing 
so on an explicitly collective level. 
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classification. The social analysis of symbolic boundaries exposes the historical variability and 
contingency of inequality. Race is not biological but a historically specific construction; gender 
differences have taken many different forms across cultures, not limited to asymmetrical 
binarisms. Symbolic boundaries are not natural, nor eternal—they are continual performances 
that can be contested and changed.  
However, symbolic boundaries are not effective in producing inequality apart from the 
social groups appropriating and implementing them. Boundaries are managed by a wide array of 
social groups, formulating their own interpretations and boundary expectations in practice. 
Cultural codes do not automatically materialize; rather, communities interpret and apply those 
codes to their situation, constructing a shared perception of in-groups and out-groups. Several 
sociologists have recently emphasized the group processes and practices that mediate culture’s 
influence over perception and action in this way (Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003; Lichterman 
2008; Schwalbe et al 200).  
In the interactionist theory of Schwalbe and his colleagues, for instance, boundary-
maintenance is one of four generic reproduction processes generating social inequalities. They 
define boundary-maintenance as the social activity of transmitting cultural capital through access 
to selective networks. The transmission of capital largely takes place behind the scenes, serving 
to naturalize inequality in social perceptions. Their emphasis on the processual dynamics of 
inequality fits well with a relational perspective in sociological theory, as found in Brubaker’s 
critique of identity substantialism above. It also goes to show how inequalities are not natural or 
simply inherited from past times—they are historical and continually reiterated through practice. 
 Social boundaries divide people into classes and hierarchies, but the symbolic basis of 
division varies radically from context to context. Almost anything can become a vehicle of 
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boundaries and a signifier of in-group or out-group status. Amy Wilkins (2008a; 2008b) has 
demonstrated how emotional cultures—e.g. happiness at a Christian college, macabre angst for a 
goth subculture, etc.—and sexual practices became the basis of youth identity, distinguishing 
insiders from “mainstream” others. Emotions and sexuality are signifiers of identity combining 
with other cultural elements, like styles of dress, music, and hairstyle—all of which can become 
symbolic vehicles of insider status.24 Likewise, religious beliefs and practices can be another 
such signifier of difference. In their studies of American national identity, Penny Edgell and her 
colleagues (Edgell and Tranby 2010; Edgell et al 2006) have shown that religious belief—no 
matter what kind of deity, God, Buddha or ‘universal spirit’—is a marker of belonging to the  
American national community. Most Americans draw a symbolic boundary between pious faith-
believing citizens and the atheist as other. Overall atheists are more despised than any other 
socially feared and stereotyped category, from immigrants to homosexuals to Muslims. This 
symbolic boundary is the object of intense emotional attachments and the source of hostile 
feelings.  
  
2) Social boundaries emerge from a reciprocal relationship between cultural 
classifications and group psychology. 
 Symbolic boundaries are not purely cognitive. They become the object of the affective 
attachments of social groups, enforcing and protecting the distinctions they make between 
people. These person-making boundaries can evoke depths of emotional intensity, as seen in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Wilkins also revealed that the purpose of some symbolic boundaries may be to conceal others. Behind seemingly 
innocent subcultural variations and practices of distinction, group members may be getting training in cultural and 
technological capital that reproduces their middle class success later in adulthood. Thus, class reproduction is again 
naturalized through the transmission of capital. Or, subcultures based on an explicitly egalitarian identity, may turn 
out to naturalize other masculine privileges. 
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nationalism studies and Edgell’s research on the ‘atheist as other.’ Symbolic boundaries are 
important in mobilizing and purifying group identity, and for this function, they pull together 
both cognitive and affective dimensions. This intersection or linkage between cognitive and 
affective elements emerges from a reciprocal relationship between discourse and group psycho-
dynamics. An example from above: those who watch more television usually feel more intense 
national affects and attachments to those symbolic boundaries in the modern political world 
(Phillips 1996).  
 Eliasoph and Lichterman (2003) argue that boundaries are one element of a situationally 
determined group style. They define a ‘group style’ as interactional rules and expectations held 
by members of a group. These patterns depend on speech norms, expected member 
responsibilities, and boundary conceptions—what members of the group have in common and 
what the group’s relationship to other publics looks like. A group style, for instance, of 
seriousness or horseplay emerges from such rules, including opinions and feelings toward 
outsiders.  
Group boundaries can vary in several regards according to the overall group style: groups 
can have rigid boundaries that are impermeable and highly exclusive to outsiders, or groups can 
tolerate porous, more inclusive boundaries. Porosity or exclusivity is scalar property of group 
interactions shaping that group’s experience and perceptions. Eliasoph and Lichterman propose 
that such variable boundary qualities mediate the influence of culture upon actions and attitudes 
held by the group. Boundaries are part of a group interactional style influencing how collective 
representations are understood and interpreted. Phillips (1996) observes this process occurring on 
a national level. The intensity and exclusivity of emotional attachments to national boundaries 
influences attitudes toward issues like multiculturalism and aboriginality in Australia.  
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 Thus, there can be different modes of boundary drawing. Some social groups experience 
insider/outsider boundaries as clearly delineated and mutually exclusive. For others, boundaries 
are fuzzy and there is more tolerance for a brackish zone of social interactions. Child psychology 
also verifies an alternative experience of boundaries not obeying the logic of a mutually 
exclusive self-other distinction. Psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott (1971) identified an intermediate 
stage in a child’s psychological development in between a state of psychic undifferentiation 
(“subjective omnipotence”) and a world of clear separations between subjects and objects. For 
the toddler, the “transitional object,” e.g. the blanket or doll, is not seen as separate from one’s 
selfhood. A similar variation in the experience of boundaries occurs within social groups and 
national identity. Some religious civic groups do not make a firm distinction between church and 
the world; other evangelical groups are more likely to (Lichterman 2008). Transgression and 
impurity is not necessarily perceived as a major social threat. It depends upon the group style and 
the interactional setting—the porosity of a group’s boundaries, the depth of their emotional 
attachments and concern with orderliness. In some cases, a transgression may be punished, like 
an impurity expelled so as to re-naturalize symbolic boundaries. In other cases, blurred 
boundaries may be tolerated, even appreciated, or seen as a resource for the de-naturalization of 
boundaries through civil society struggles.  
 
3) Some symbolic boundaries are more constitutive of the self than others.  
Above, I distinguished between the boundary drawing of social identities and a more 
basic type of symbolic boundary constituting personhood, such as a subject’s experience of 
bodily borders. On several levels, symbolic boundaries are central to the discursive constitution 
of subjectivity. Contemporary social psychologists and poststructuralist social theorists would 
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agree on this point. Social identity theory explores how groups reinforce collective identities 
through us-them distinctions surrounding nationality, sexuality, race and ethnicity, religion, 
class, etc. However, I suspect that symbolic boundaries are also operating on the basement level 
of subjectivity, in regards to core distinctions between self and other, between humans and non-
humans, between different kinds of bodies, between first-person and second- or third-person 
speech, etc. Constructing these boundaries, done in a multitude of ways across cultures, is a 
necessary condition of subjectification.  
Even basic boundaries between self and other are historically specific and culturally 
variable (Geertz 1973). Deborah Rose’s self-critical ethnography of Australian aboriginal 
communities gives a lucid example of this variability (Rose 1999). The aboriginal experience of 
personhood does not recognize the individual as the proprietor of the body as Western cultures 
do. Personhood extends beyond the interiorless body to include special geographical places, 
other living creatures, sacred totemic animals and plants, etc. In other words, Australian 
aboriginal culture maps an alternative set of symbolic boundaries between self and other. A 
multiplicity of living things, including a Nature imagined as sentient, can participate in the same 
shared subjectivity. Clifford Geertz (1973) has made similar observations of Balinese culture: 
instead of being delimited by the boundaries of the individual, subjectivity can be attached to a 
social role and ritual that various persons can occupy. Subjectivity is a culturally defined 
performance, repeated throughout time by different bearers.  
Perhaps, poststructuralist theories of subjectivity are so refreshing because they apply 
some of this strangeness to Western practices and perceptions: various bodies can occupy 
subject-positions demarcated by the discursive-technological arrangements of schools, factories, 
offices, homes, etc., so that subjectivity is more a property of places and roles, rather than human 
   51 
individuals. Indeed, the posthumanist or actor-network branch of poststructuralism asserts that 
nonhuman entities, from experimental cyborg mice to mega-computers, are equally subjects 
according to their place in a discursive web of agents. 
All this goes to show that even fundamental self-other boundaries are variable, culturally 
particular and can be usefully be re-imagined in alternative non-Western ways. My final point is 
that sociologists should be careful before universalizing contemporary identity politics and other 
modern performances of social identity in nation, sexuality, subculture, class or gender. Social 
identities depend upon a bedrock of self-other distinctions. If this bedrock changes, so does the 
possibility and nature of social identities. Identity politics today is conditioned by deep 
discursive shifts toward an expressive conception of subjectivity, emerging from counter-
enlightenment European Romanticism (Taylor 1989). The idea that one’s symbolic gestures are 
expressive of an internal primordial identity is a presupposition promoted by romantic Western 
conceptions of subjectivity. It makes possible individual practices of the self as well as wider 
civil society movements mobilized by the search for social recognition.  
Accordingly, my preferred model of subjectivity has two corresponding tiers. First, there 
is a basic skeletal structure of subject-functions, widely shared across cultures, though manifest 
in numerous different configurations.25 This level of subjectivity is observed most frequently by 
cognitive psychologists and linguists, but also the occasional anthropologist or sociologist, as in 
the Chicago School’s early 20th century theorizing of the self. On top of this base, there is 
another layer of social identities, discursive interpellations, identifications with groups, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Despite this great diversity, there are probably limits to the variability of human personhood. The universality of 
these limits is due to a number of subject-functions or self-schema, which can be turned on or off depending on the 
cultural context. Not all human societies turn on the cognitive switch, so to speak, that draws a clear and sharp 
distinction between the self and the world. Linguists have also shown how quite different languages can emerge 
from the same deep ‘universal grammar’ of the human brain (Chomsky 1965). Analogously, there are basic subject-
functions, deeper for instance than national identity no matter how intense a country’s nationalism is. Some such 
boundaries are more intense and tacit in our experience than others, they structure everyday self-perception and 
interaction in fundamental ways. 
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subcultural identities, religions, nations, and forms of community belonging. Sociologists and 
cultural anthropologists excel at interpretive analysis on this level. Both tiers though are 
discursive in nature and both depend upon the cognitive-affective activity of othering and 
boundary drawing.   
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